Kochen-Specker theorems assure the breakdown of certain types of non-contextual hidden variable theories through the non-existence of global, holistic frame functions; alas they do not allow us to identify where this breakdown occurs, nor the extent of it. It was recently shown [Phys. Rev. A 86, 062109 (2012)] that this breakdown does not occur everywhere; here we show that it is maximal in that it occurs almost everywhere, and thus prove that quantum indeterminacy-often referred to as contextuality or value indefiniteness-is a global property as is often assumed. In contrast to the Kochen-Specker theorem, we only assume the weaker non-contextuality condition that any potential value assignments that may exist are locally non-contextual.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Kochen-Specker theorem [2, 3] proves the impossibility of the existence of certain hidden variable theories for quantum mechanics by showing the existence of a finite set of observables O for which the following two assumptions cannot be simultaneously true for any given individual system: (P1) every observable in O has a pre-assigned definite value; and (P2) the outcomes of measurements of observables are non-contextual.
Non-contextuality means that the outcomes of measurements of observables are independent of whatever other co-measurable observables are measured alongside them. Due to complementarity, the observables in O cannot all be simultaneously co-measurable, that is, formally, commuting.
The Kochen-Specker theorem does not explicitly identify certain particular observables which violate one or both assumptions (P1) and (P2), but only proves their existence. This form of the theorem was amply sufficient for its intended scope, primarily to explore the logic of quantum propositions [2] . The relation between value indefinite observables, that is, observables which do not have definite values before measurement, and quantum randomness in [2, 3] , requires a more precise form of the Kochen-Specker theorem in which some value indefinite observables can be located (identified). A stronger form of the Kochen-Specker theorem providing this information was proved in [1] .
In this paper we extend these results to show that indeed all observables on a quantum system must be value indefinite except for those corresponding to the contexts compatible with the state preparation. While it may seem intuitive that quantum indeterminism is widespread, it does not follow from existing no-go theorems, so it is important that a theoretical grounding be given to this intuition. This not only helps provide an information theoretic certification of quantum random bits, but also develops our understanding of the origin of quantum indeterminism.
II. LOGICAL INDETERMINACY PRINCIPLE
Pitowsky [4] (also in the subsequent paper [5] with Hrushovski) gave a constructive proof of Gleason's theorem in terms of orthogonality graphs which motivated the study of probability distributions on finite sets of rays. In this context he proved a result called "the logic indeterminacy principle" which has a striking similarity with the Kochen-Specker theorem and appears as if it could be used to locate value indefiniteness. However, as we discuss in this section, this is not the case.
For the sake of appreciating Pitowsky's logical indeterminacy principle, some definitions have to be reviewed. According to [5] , a frame function on a set O ⊂ R n of quantum states in a dimension n ≥ 3 Hilbert space is a function p : O → [0, 1] such that:
(ii) For all complex α with |α| = 1 and all x ∈ O, p(|x ) = p(α |x ).
A Boolean frame function is a frame function taking only 0, 1 values, i.e. for all |x ∈ O, p(|x ) ∈ {0, 1}.
Pitowsky's logical indeterminacy principle [4] states that for all states |a , |b ∈ R 3 with 0 < | a|b | < 1, there exists a finite set of states O with |a , |b ∈ O such that there is no Boolean frame
A consequence of this principle is that there is no Boolean frame function p on O such that p(|a ) = 1. From the logical indeterminacy principle we can deduce the Kochen-Specker theorem by identifying each state with the observable projecting onto it, as a Boolean frame function simply gives a non-contextual, value definite yes-no value assignment, so (P2) is satisfied.
As noted by Hrushovski and Pitowsky [5] , the logical indeterminacy principle is stronger than the Kochen-Specker theorem because the result is true for arbitrary frame functions which can take any value in the unit interval [0, 1], but which are restricted to Boolean values for |a , |b .
In fact, we may be tempted to use the logical indeterminacy principle to "locate" a value indefinite observable. Indeed, if we fix p and choose |a ∈ R 3 such that p(|a ) = 1, then, by the logical indeterminacy principle, for every distinct non-orthogonal unit vector |b ∈ R 3 it is impossible to have p(|b ) = 1 and p(|b ) = 0, hence one could be inclined to conclude that the observable projecting onto |b is value indefinite. However, such reasoning would be incorrect because if p(|b ) were 1, then the logical indeterminacy principle merely concludes that p does not exist; the same conclusion is obtained if p(|b ) were 0. Hence, in both cases p does not exist, so it makes no sense to talk about its values, in particular, about p(|b ). (Pointedly stated, from a physical viewpoint, p(|a ) as well as p(|b ) could take on any of the four combinations of definite values, provided that (P1) or (P2) is violated for some other observable in O. Nevertheless, as we shall demonstrate in Section V, using the formalism of [1] , all observables in O except |a and those commuting with |a are indeed provable value indefinite.) This means that using the logical indeterminacy principle we get the same global information derived in the Kochen-Specker theorem, namely that some observable in O has to be value indefinite, and no more. The reason for this limitation is the use of frame functions, which by definition must be defined everywhere: they can model "local" value definiteness, but not "local" value indefiniteness, which, as in the Kochen-Specker theorem, "emerges" only as a global phenomenon.
III. VALUE INDEFINITENESS AND CONTEXTUALITY
To remedy the above deficiency we will use the formalism proposed in [1] for pure quantum states. Specifically, we define value (in)definiteness and contextuality in the framework of quantum logic of Birkhoff and von Neumann [6, 7] and Kochen and Specker [8, 9] .
Projection operators projecting on to the linear subspace spanned by a non-zero vector |ψ will be denoted by P ψ = (|ψ ψ|)/ ψ|ψ .
Let O = {P ψ 1 , P ψ 2 , . . . } be a non-empty set of projection observables in the n-dimensional Our definitions of both value definiteness and non-contextually are formulated in a very flexible sense. They allow us to specify individual value (in)definite observables, and only require observables which are value definite to behave non-contextually. This technicality is critical in the ability to localise the Kochen-Specker theorem.
IV. STRONG KOCHEN-SPECKER THEOREM
The incompatibility between the assumptions (P1) and (P2) is not maximal in the following sense: for any set of observables, there exists an admissible assignment function under which the set of observables is value definite and at least one observable is non-contextual. This shows that not all observables need to be value indefinite [1] , because for every pure quantum state at least the propositions associated with the state preparation are certain, and thus value definite.
However, there always exist pairs of observables such that, if one of them is assigned the value 1
by an admissible assignment function under which O is non-contextual, the other must be "value indefinite". This result is deduced in [1] using the weaker assumption that not all observables are assumed to be value definite, formally expressed by the admissibility of v. In particular, an observable is deduced to be value definite only when the values of other commuting value-definite observables require it to be so.
The theorem derived in Ref. [1] , and henceforth called the strong Kochen-Specker theorem, can be used to "locate" a provable value indefinite observable which when measured "produces" a quantum random bit, which is guaranteed to be produced by a value indefinite observable under some physical assumptions: Let |a , |b ∈ R 3 be unit vectors such that
. On the other hand, the sets of observables given in the proofs of the stronger form of the Kochen-Specker theorem presented here are carefully constructed such that any attempt to place the value indefiniteness on a P c necessarily contradicts the admissibility of v. For example, it would require a context containing an observable assigned the value 1, and another observable being value indefinite. This contradicts both the admissibility of v, and the physical understanding of what it means for that observable to be assigned the value 1-since we know measuring that observable will give the value 1, measuring the other observables must give the value 0, and hence the other observables are necessarily value definite. As a result, we are forced to conclude that P b to the existing result. This reduction is more subtle and difficult than the first one.
For the purpose of illustrating the reduction technique, let us state the following reduction lemma (derived in Ref. [1] ), which will also turn out to be important for the reduction we will present later: Given any two unit vectors |a , |b with 0 < | a|b | < 1 and an x such that | a|b | < This lemma is illustrated in Fig. 2 and constitutes a simple "forcing" of value definiteness:
given P a and P b both with the value 1, there is a P c which is "closer" (i.e. at a smaller angle of our choosing) to P a which forces P c to also take the value 1.
This reduction, however, requires necessarily that |x| > |p|, and finding a reduction to "force" in the other direction (i.e. towards larger angles between P a and P c ) is difficult. Here we present an 
O.
The proof of this lemma is based on the generalisation of a specific reduction for the case
; that is, it is a "forcing" argument in the required direction. The
Greechie diagram for this is depicted in Fig. 2 . In essence, this figure consists of three copies of the reduction shown in Fig. 1 glued together, ensuring that the Greechie diagram is indeed realisable. Specifically, the important relations are:
, b|c = . The angles between unit vectors in this proof are then scaled, in a way which we will soon make precise, to fit the required a|b for the general case. However, since this doesn't allow us to assert that an arbitrary |c must have the value 1 in the same way we could using the reduction lemma, this reduction is then iterated a finite number of times until a sufficiently small a|c is obtained.
Let us now formally prove the iterated reduction lemma. The constants which will be used for scaling, obtained from the reduction shown in Fig. 2 .
Given the initial |a , |b and the above constants, we thus make use of the following scaled angles between the relevant observables:
Once |v 2 is determined via the procedure to follow, we take the following:
Without loss of generality, let |a = (1, 0, 0) and |b = (p 1 , q 1 , 0) where p 1 = a|b and q 1 = 1 − p 2 1 . This fixes our basis for the rest of the reduction. We want to have |v 1 such that a|v 1 = x 1 = cos θ a,v 1 . From the reduction lemma we know this is possible since x 1 > p 1 (because α 1 < 1), and we have |v 1 = (x 1 , y 1 , z 1 ), y 1 = p 1 (1 − x 2 1 )/q 1 x 1 and z 1 = 1 − x 2 1 − y 2 1 . We now want |v 2 such that a|v 2 = x 2 = cos θ a,v 2 (this is possible since α 2 < 1). In order to use the same general form (specified in the reduction lemma) as above, we perform a change of basis to bring |v 1 into the xy-plane, describe |v 2 in this basis using the above result, then perform the inverse change of basis. Our new basis vectors are given by |e 2 = (1, 0, 0),
where q 2 = 1 − x 2 1 , and |g 2 = |e 2 × | f 2 = (0, z 1 /q 2 , −y 1 /q 2 ). We thus have the transformation matrix
We can now put y 2 = x 1 (1 − x 2 2 )/q 2 x 2 and z 2 = 1 − x 2 2 − y 2 2 so that in our original basis we have
We note at this point that the constant θ b,v 2 is now determined, and we have
For the last iteration of the reduction, we want to find |c such that b|c = x 3 = cos θ b,c (again this will be possible since α 3 < 1). Let p 3 = b|v 2 and q 3 = 1 − p 2 3 . Again we perform a basis transformation; we have |e 3 = |b = (p 1 , q 1 , 0),
where k is a constant such that | f 3 is normalized, and
The transformation matrix is then given by
We now put y 3 = p 3 (1 − x 2 3 )/q 3 x 3 and z 3 = 1 − x 2 3 − y 2 3 so that in the original basis we have
Note that only the first term is of importance in the above expression. Specifically, we want to prove that a|c < a|b = p 1 , where
The product a|c is, with appropriate substitutions, a function of one variable, p 1 ; let us denote f (p 1 ) = a|c . We thus need to determine if, for p 1 ∈ 3 √ 14 , 1 the inequality f (p 1 ) < p 1 holds.
We note that f (p 1 ) is well behaved and continuous on this domain, and lim
hence using a combination of direct analysis and symbolic calculation [10] and plots, we show that the inequality is indeed true. Further details of the analysis are given in the Appendix. Using symbolic calculation [10] for a Taylor series expansion around p 1 = 1, we find that for
as claimed and for some ε > 0 we have f (p 1 ) < p 1 for p 1 ∈ (1 − ε, 1). Further, the continuity of f on this domain can be guaranteed by noting that f (p 1 ) is simply composed of trigonometric functions with arguments from (−1, 1) \ {0}; since these are all continuous, so is f . From Fig. 3 and the above results it follows that to prove the inequality
, 1 we need to show that for no
Since we know from the Taylor series expansion that f (p 1 ) < p 1 in the neighbourhood of
, 1 we were to have f (p ′ 1 ) > p ′ 1 , then for some p ′′ 1 we must have
, which is false (see Fig. 4 ).
From Fig. 3 (and also from the fact that the derivative of f (p 1 ) > 1) it also follows that the
is strictly decreasing with p 1 on
, 1 ⊂ (0.8, 1). Thus, for large enough
, and the projector P c k must be assigned the value 1 by v. This completes the proof. , we can appeal simply to the strong Kochen-Specker theorem, so let
Without loss of generality, we can assume that a|b ∈ (0, 1), since P b = P αb for α ∈ R with |α| = 1, so the set of projection observables O obtained under this assumption will give the required result for the general case. we show that this also leads to a contradiction as follows.
Let p = a|b and q = 1 − p 2 . We construct an orthonormal basis in which |a ≡ (1, 0, 0) and |b ≡ (p, q, 0). Define |α ≡ (0, 1, 0), |β ≡ (0, 0, 1) and |c ≡ (q, −p, 0). Then {|a , |α , |β } and {|b , |c , |β } are orthonormal bases for R 3 , so we can define the contexts C 1 = {P a , P α , P β } and
Since v(P a ,C 1 ) = 1, we must have v(P β ,C 1 ) = v(P β ,C 2 ) = 0 by the admissibility of v. But since, by assumption, v(P b ,C 2 ) = 0, we must have v(P c ,C 2 ) = 1. However, this also contradicts the strong Kochen-Specker theorem, since it is easily seen that
Hence, we conclude that P b must be value indefinite under v. This then completes the proof the extended Kochen-Specker theorem.
We are now able to answer, in a measure theoretic way, the question posed in the title of In terms of unit vectors, the set in the above proof corresponds to the set {(1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0)} ∪ {(0, x, y) | x 2 + y 2 = 1} on the three dimensional unit sphere, consisting of (i) a single point of dimension zero, and (ii) a great circle of dimension one. Again this set has Lebesgue measure zero on the unit sphere.
VI. FINAL COMMENTS
One could put our findings in the following perspective. In response to Bell-, as well as KochenSpecker-and Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger-type theorems, the "quantum realists" -among them
Bell suggesting that [11, p. 451 ] "the result of an observation may reasonably depend . . . on the complete disposition of the apparatus" -have been inclined to adopt contextual value definiteness in order to save a kind of "contextual reality." Contextual reality claims that all measurable properties exist, regardless of whether they are actually measured, or are counterfactuals; albeit these properties may be context dependent. In this way one could still maintain the existence of some "real (though counterfactual, context dependent) physical property."
While one can probably never rule out such a (necessarily nonlocal) contextual reality, our re-sults explore the full extent of value indefiniteness. It is this formalised notion of quantum indeterminism which can be a crucial element of quantum information theory, particularly cryptography and random number generation.
One immediate result of the above findings is that, if one insists on the type of non-contextuality formalized by admissible assignments, then value definiteness cannot exist outside of a star-shaped configuration in Greechie-type orthogonality diagrams. It is important to note that this form of non-contextuality is weak in the sense that it is only required to apply locally when a definite value is assigned. Thereby, no holistic frame function on all quantum observables need to be assumed.
Let us be more specific what is meant by the "star(-shaped)" configuration of a quantum state |ψ . We consider a a quantum system prepared in a state corresponding to the proposition that "a particular detector D ψ clicks among, say, three mutual exclusive detectors" (corresponding to a three dimensional Hilbert space quantum model). Such a state can be formalized by a projector P ψ = |ψ ψ|, or, equivalently, by the linear subspace spanned by the normalized vector |ψ (together maybe with the other two orthonormal vectors to |ψ and to each other). Now, if a quantum state |ψ is prepared such that the detector D ψ clicks, that corresponds to assigning |ψ the value v(P ψ , ·) = 1. |ψ 's star is formed by taking some or all vectors |ϕ whose value assignments are consistent with v(P ψ , ·) = 1. These are value assignments v(P ϕ , ·) = 0, with |ϕ orthogonal to |ψ ; that is, ϕ|ψ = 0. Such potential observables |ϕ ϕ| are thus value definite. As they correspond to vectors orthogonal to |ψ , they are, diagrammatically (i.e., in terms of Greechie orthogonality diagrams) speaking, "in |ψ 's star."
All other conceivable observables corresponding to vectors "outside of |ψ 's star" remain value indefinite relative to our assumptions. The configuration can be represented by the Greechie orthogonality diagram depicted in Fig. 5(a) . This finding is consistent with the Heisenberg uncertainty relations and quantum complementarity. Note that this still allows the value definite existence of a continuum of contexts (meaning that all observables therein are value definite) interlinked at |ψ , but on a set of Lebesgue measure zero.
One could be inclined to go one step further and conjecture that there does not exist any value definite observable outside of a single context [12] . This context is defined by the preparation of the state: it consists of the observable corresponding to |ψ , as well as of the two other orthogonal projectors associated with the two idle detectors that do not click if D ψ clicks. The configuration can be represented by the Greechie orthogonality diagram depicted in Fig. 5(b) . This conjecture is strictly speculative with respect to quantum mechanics, because with our assumptions it seems that 
